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1. ESSENCE PROJECT
The Essence project (Emerging Security Standards to the EU power Network controls and other Critical 
Equipment) is a study to evaluate costs and benefits of the implementation of security standards to critical 
electric infrastructure, based on two case studies. 
Networked computers reside at the heart of critical infrastructures, these become then vulnerable to cyber-
attacks that can inhibit their operation, corrupt valuable data, or expose private information. Such attacks 
might affect large portions of the European power system, make repair difficult and cause huge societal 
impact, thus, pressure to ensure cyber security of control and communication systems is now very strong 
worldwide. Frameworks have been developed or are under development at present, but it is difficult to 
evaluate costs (which can be huge) and benefits of their adoption.  
In this scenario the key objectives of ESSENCE include: 
1. Developing a common understanding of industrial needs and requirements regarding the security of
control systems and the related standardization efforts;
2. Identifying power system vulnerabilities induced by control systems, and estimating the likely socio-
economic impact of failures due to faults and attacks exploiting those vulnerabilities;
3. Evaluating emerging frameworks for ensuring industrial control systems security, and establishing the
costs of their adoption on an objective basis;
4. Recommending a pathway towards adoption of one or more of the above frameworks to the European
power system infrastructure, having specific regard to EU transnational infrastructures as defined by
the Directive 2008/114/EC.
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2. WHAT'S AN EMERGING SECURITY STANDARD?  
Standards are a form of law or regulation that covers from professional conduct to technical interoperability. 
Standards can be defined in different ways according to the sector. Generally, they are “recommended 
practices in the manufacturing of products or materials or in the conduct of a business, art, or profession”1. 
A standard can also be “a basis for comparison; a reference point against which other things can be 
evaluated”2. 
Some standards are set by organisations, which write them in a technically complex way, showing the life 
cycle driven by some products, services and intellectual property. On the other hand, Standards Development 
Activities (SDA) are universally accepted as they are believed to be transparent, even though they cannot 
expose all interests.  
Formerly, these policies were set by governments as traditional de jure Standards Setting Activities (SSA) 
through regulatory agencies. However, nowadays the participation of other agents and stakeholders is 
thought to be essential to improve quality and completeness of standards. This is why standards are being 
made by the private sector, as Voluntary Consensus Standards (VCS). Among these private agents, some 
examples would be consortia of businesses, trade associations and non-profit organisations, along with 
government agencies and private citizens, who work together as Standard Development Organizations 
(S.D.O.s). Some of these stakeholders can compete in the market, but they cooperate to develop the standard. 
It is necessary to show the rewards associated with creating standards to prevent the private sector from 
believing that they are money and time-wasting activities3. 
Standards are important because of the following reasons: 
 They can alter or determine current and future research and development of products. 
 They have a considerable impact on life and work. 
 They can make easier or hinder the entry of new agents in an industry. 
 They can consolidate existing businesses, or encourage them to improve current practices. 
In the past, standards were published after the product or practice had been developed and used by the 
public. However, nowadays standards are developed at the same time products and services are designed, 
and products cannot be sold until standards are ready to be published.  
                                                 
1  Glossary, Metropolitan Water District of southern California,  
http://www.mwdh2o.com/mwdh2o/pages/yourwater/glossary/glossary01.html 
2 WordNet, Cognitive Science Laboratory, Princeton University  
http://wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=standard  
3 John W. Bagby, professor of Information, Science and Technology of the Pennsylvania State University. The Emerging 
Standards War in Cyberspace Security.  http://faculty.ist.psu.edu/bagby/SIG/EmergingCyberspaceSecurityStandardsWar.pdf 
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Cybersecurity standards are a mix of I.C.T. interoperability and technical standards and professional or 
behavioural standards. They include standards from financial accounting, financial audit, I.T. audit, 
information assurance security, systems/network security, telephony/wireless security, intellectual property 
security and so on.  
Standards are deeply studied in the Technical Report Deliverable 1 of Essence project: “Considerations on 
SCADA Standards”, written by Ugo Finardi, Elena Ragazzi and Alberto Stefanini. According to this 
document, implementing security standards can be a big cost for private companies. Moreover, these costs 
cannot be evaluated reliably before the implementation of the measures. This implies that medium or small 
businesses are likely unable to afford implementing standards.  
Another problem is that companies can determine the risk of sharing information on critical infrastructure 
information, but the benefit of implementing cyber security standards is much harder to be evaluated. 
Besides, the benefit is not only for the company but also for stakeholders involved and society in general, 
who have not to pay for it.  
The only place where the implementation of standards has been carried out is the U.S.A. If Europe tried to 
develop similar standards, it would be easier as in Europe there are far less companies in the power system 
sector. Even though the competition is increasing and new small companies are being founded, mostly 
renewable energies plants, critical infrastructures are still operated by few companies. In many cases, 
transmission and distribution are controlled by the government, so the costs of implementing standards 
would be shared between private and public agents.  
A problem which can arise in Europe which has not in the U.S.A. is that some companies have voluntarily 
adopted some security standards. These standards can be very different, and it can be difficult to come to an 
agreement on a common framework if some companies have already made big investments in security. 
Frequently, building a totally new security system can be cheaper than upgrading the old system.   
In “Considerations on SCADA Standards”, seven standards or guidelines have been compared. The NIST 
800-53is the only standard which is fully developed and uses a terminology clear enough. If a standard is 
implemented, the European stakeholders have to be involved in the process.  
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Finally, this document came to the following conclusions: 
 The implementation of a common framework on cyber security must take into account differences in 
the European power systems: different size, reliability, market structure, role of public agents, national 
regulations, etc. 
 There are different ways to implement a new security standard in Europe: voluntary, voluntary with 
economic incentives, mandatory in some countries in some critical assets, mandatory in some countries 
in the entire sector, mandatory in the EU in all sectors, etc. However, the more sectors and countries are 
involved, the more difficult will be to reach a common standard, because of the lack of a common 
European authority and different interests. A solution could be implementing different frameworks 
depending on the sector and country (all standards should respect minimum requirements) to assess 
different solutions and converge to a common standard in the long term.  
 The cost of the implementation of the measures is afforded by the facility owners, while the benefits are 
shared by the public. On the other hand, voluntary application of standards cannot ensure that they are 
correctly implemented, as bigger companies can afford it but smaller cannot. This means that the public 
regulator should share expenditures with the operator, and ensure the correct implementation of the 
measures.     
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3. WHY ATTACK SCENARIOS DEFINITION? 
The European Union (EU) electric power system is very large and geographically dispersed. It covers the 
area from Portugal (West) to Poland (East) and from Italy (South) to Finland (North). Physically, the system 
consists of generation plants: thermal, nuclear, hydro and renewable power plants to produce electricity, 
transmission and distribution networks including transmission and distribution lines and substations, control 
centres, communications systems and other infrastructure facilities required to produce electric energy and 
perform reliable transfer to final consumers. All elements of the electric system have different vulnerability 
sources, which are potential subjects of disruption or destruction. 
Deregulation of European energy system, due to EC Energy Directives, has increased competition in the 
energy system and according to Third Party Access changed also traditional energy players. Former vertical 
integrated utilities have been moving to separate entities as: transmission system operators (TSO), 
distribution operators (DO), independent power producers (IPP), generation operators (GO), market actors, 
customers, metering providers, and others. 
The electric sector has undergone significant reorganization in the last decades, mainly in order to increase 
competition. Liberalization, privatisation and additionally environmental constraints to the electrical sector, 
have made electric security system more complex and crucial for the economy in all members countries as 
well as exacerbated the system vulnerability.  
Competitive energy markets, growth in distributed generation with use of renewable energy sources and 
growing dependence on imported energy, increase the complexity of the operational level of infrastructures 
which control all necessary processes. 
Physically the electric system is composed of power plants and the whole group of components to store fuel, 
generate electricity, including protection, monitoring and control system and delivering the energy to the 
grid, power transmission and distribution system and system and market operators. Power flows from 
generating plants to customers through the transmission and distribution network. Electricity is not 
economically storable in large amounts, what is produced must be the instant used. The electric power 
infrastructure is designed to deliver electricity to final users with continuity and quality of supply.4 
There are several types of generating plants: fossil fuel (coal, oil and gas), nuclear, hydro and renewable 
distributed generation (wind, solar, geothermal, biomass, biogas). The largest ones are fossil fuel and nuclear 
plants and they contain fundamental critical assets including facilities necessary to generate electricity 
(generators, power turbines), control room and substation to deliver energy to the grid.  
                                                 
4 Structure of Energy Sector Control Centers: Analysis of the Different Levels and Uses of Control Centers in the Energy System (Electricity and Natural Gas), 
Octavio: Energy System Control Centers Security, an EU Approach, March 2009.  
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In 2009 year total EU installed generation capacity amounted to 842 GW, in this: 455 GW of fossil fuels 
fired power plants, (54%), 135 GW of nuclear power (16%), 143 GW of hydro power stations (17%) and 
109 GW of renewable power plants (13%).5 
Total net electricity generation in the EU-27 reached 3000 TWh in 2009 year. In this, electricity generation 
came from combustible fuels amounted to 1662 TWh (55,4%), and nuclear 834 TWh (27,8%). Electricity 
generated from hydro and renewable energy sources amounted to 504 TWh what stated 16,8 % of total 
output.6 
The transmission system include high-voltage overhead lines and underground cables (110 kV and above), 
substations, other equipment and installation indispensable for the proper operation, including control centres 
coordinating operations.  
The substation is a high-voltage electric system facility, used to switch generators, equipment, and circuits or 
lines in and out of a system. It is also used to change AC voltages from one level to another, and/or change 
alternating current to direct current or direct current to alternating current.7 The substation consists of: bus 
bars, circuit breakers, switches, transformers, auxiliary high voltage equipment, auxiliary equipment for 
control and protection (IEDs), substation SCADA.  
The substation SCADA system supports remote or local operator control of substation equipment, such as 
opening or closing a breaker. The SCADA system provides three critical functions in operation at the 
substation: data acquisition, supervisory control and alarm display and control. 
Bus bars are aluminium or copper conductors supported by insulators that interconnect the transmission 
lines, transformers, loads or generators, at the same voltage level. This is a static element that only provides a 
common connexion point to elements connected in the substation at the same level of voltage. 
A circuit breaker is a device used to open or close an electric power circuit either during normal power 
system operation or during abnormal conditions. A circuit breaker serves in the course of normal system 
operation to energize or de-energize circuits (lines, cables, transformers, generators or loads).  
Switches (or isolators) are elements designed to modify the topology in the substation. They can be operated 
with voltage, but do not have capacity to interrupt any current. Switches may be operated manually, in 
accordance with decision of an operator, either from the substation control room or by supervisory control 
from the remote control centre. 
Transformers are electromechanical elements that modify voltage level. Besides the transformer losses 
(around 1 ÷ 3%), energy at both sides of the transformer is the same but at different voltage and current (the 
higher is the voltage the lower is the current for the same power level). 
                                                 
5 Power Statistics & Trends 2011Synopsis, Euroelectric: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-EI-12-001/EN/KS-EI-12-001-
EN.PDF 
6 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-EI-12-001/EN/KS-EI-12-001-EN.PDF 
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The ratio is relation between voltages at both sides. Some transformers are capable to modify their ratio to 
certain extend without disconnecting the transformer. This capacity is used to help in the network voltage 
control. 
In the substation there is another high voltage equipment with different objectives, mainly for voltage control 
or measurement. The most common control elements are: 
 Reactance: equipment designed to take up reactive power from the network. The effect will be to reduce 
the voltage level. 
 Capacitor: equipment designed to produce reactive current. The effect will be to increase the voltage 
level. 
 Static VAr Compensator (SVC): device for providing fast-acting reactive power compensation on high-
voltage electricity transmission networks. SVCs are part of the flexible AC transmission system 
(FACTS) family of devices. SVCs are used both on bulk power transmission circuits to regulate voltage 
and contribute to steady-state stability. 
 Measurement high voltage elements. In electricity there are only two elements that can be directly 
measured: voltage and current. With both measures active or reactive power can be calculated. To 
measure voltage and current the following equipment is used: voltage transformers: connected in 
parallel, they measure the voltage between an active element and the ground.8  
An overhead power line is an electric power transmission line suspended by towers or poles. Since most of 
insulation is provided by air, overhead power lines are generally the lowest-cost method of transmission of 
large quantities of electric power. Overhead lines have a specific transmission capacity which depends on 
wire characteristics and tower design.  
Electric power can also be transmitted by underground power cables. This is more expensive option, since 
the life-cycle cost of an underground power cable is two to four times the cost of an overhead power line.   
Compared to overhead lines, underground or underwater cables emit much weaker magnetic fields. 
Underground cables need a narrower strip of about 1-10 metres to install, whereas the lack of cable 
insulation requires an overhead line to be installed on a strip of about 20-200 metres wide to be kept 
permanently clear for safety, maintenance and repair. Those advantages can in some cases justify higher 
investment cost for underground cables.  
Most high-voltage underground cables for power transmission are insulated by a sheath of cross linked 
polyethylene (XLPE). Some cable may have a lead jacket in conjunction with XLPE insulation to allow fibre 
optics to be seamlessly integrated within the cable. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
7 Structure of Energy Sector Control Centers: Analysis of the Different Levels and Uses of Control Centers in the Energy System (Electricity and Natural Gas), 
Octavio: Energy System Control Centers Security, an EU Approach, March 2009.  
8 Structure of Energy Sector Control Centers: Analysis of the Different Levels and Uses of Control Centers in the Energy System (Electricity and Natural Gas), 
Octavio: Energy System Control Centers Security, an EU Approach, March 2009. 
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Distribution systems include the same elements as transmission networks but at different voltage levels and 
with a lower power i.e. below 100 kV, mostly 60 kV, 30 kV, 15 kV and low voltage, substations, other 
installation for delivering electricity to customers. 
All elements of electricity network are controlled by information systems The Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) and Energy Management System (EMS) and DMS (Distribution Management 
System) are commonly in use for real-time communication and control. 
SCADA/EMS (Energy Management System) supervises, controls, optimises and manages generation (load 
forecast, automatic generation control, monitoring and schedules, economic dispatch, balancing market load 
and transmission systems functions (such as a dispatcher power flow, contingency analysis, optimal power 
flow etc).  
SCADA/DMS (Distribution Management System) supervises, controls, optimises power distribution 
networks. Both systems enable utilities to collect, store and analyse data from data points in national or 
regional networks, perform network modelling, simulate power operation, pinpoint faults, pre-empt outages, 
and participate in energy trading markets.  
The commercial function SCADA/BMS (Business Management System) optimises business services for 
electricity consumers, supporting short term balancing mechanism, cost control, efficiency etc. 
Main responsibility of every country is to guarantee energy security and especially electricity security. 
Incorrect electricity policy may lead to energy crisis, caused extraordinary social and economic financial 
losses. 
Disrupted or destroyed electric system infrastructures in one member state has a serious impact on security 
of other member state sometimes causing a large-scale power system outage, and impose direct high 
economic costs for utility and economy and otherwise social or indirect impacts possibly leading to a threat 
to life and health of people. Even if attack itself does not result in immediately dramatic impacts to humans, 
a widespread and long duration outages could lead to significant loss of life because of stress and suffering 
and other factors.  
In recent years the EU Commission has been concerned on the security of the country members 
infrastructure which is reflecting in EC document: Green Paper “European programme for critical 
infrastructure protection” (EC 2005), adopted Directive 2008/114/EC from December 2008 year on the 
identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve 
their protection, and the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP). 
3.1. Intentions of potential attacks to the EU power Network controls and other Critical 
Equipment 
There are many definitions, theories and approaches related to terrorism in literature. The most significant 
development in official definition and statements came after September 11
th
, 2001 attacks on World Trade 
Centers and Pentagon in USA.   
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Following above events an extraordinary session of the European Council took place with the aim of 
analysing the international situation and setting the fight against terrorism as a priority objective of the 
European Union.9 
In 2001 year European Union in adopted documents: “Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the 
application of specific measures to combat terrorism” and “Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on 
specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism” 
provided the meaning of terrorists act and listed persons, groups and entities involved in the terrorists acts. 
The Article 1(3) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP sets out the definitions of terrorists act as ”intentional 
acts, which, given its nature or its context, may seriously damage a country or an international organization 
and which are defined as an offence under national law. These include: 
 attacks upon a person's life which may cause death; 
 attacks upon the physical integrity of a person; 
 kidnapping or hostage taking; 
 causing extensive destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport system, an 
 infrastructure facility; 
 seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport; 
 manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives, or of nuclear, 
biological or chemical weapons, 
 release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, 
 explosions or floods the effect of which is to endanger human life; 
 interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource, the 
effect of which is to endanger human life; 
 participating in the activities of a terrorist group, including supplying information or material resources, 
or funding its activities in any way, with knowledge of the fact that such participation will contribute to 
the criminal activities of the group.” 10 
The organized crime and terrorism have been identified as growing threats for the European security. 
European Union member countries are both: targets and a base for terrorism.  
Logistical bases for Al Qaeda cells have been uncovered in the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, Spain, 
Belgium (the European Security Strategy of 12 December 2003)11.  
                                                 
9 Defining Terrorism, Transnational terrorism, security and the rule of the low. October 1, 2008, EC project under 6FP.  
10 COUNCIL COMMON POSITION of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism (2001/931/CFSP)  Official 
Journal of the European Communities L 344/93, 28.12.2001.  
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There have been identified different types of terrorists group, in relation to their roots, motives and 
ideological goals. Main categories are: nationalist-separatists, secular utopians and political-religious.  
Nationalist-separatists (e.g. ETA, IRA, Kurdistan Workers Party), usually fight for homeland liberation. 
Second one are “Secular utopians” - left and right wingers fighting to replace state ideology. Left-wing 
terrorists (e.g. Marxist-Leninists, Columbia’s FARC and ELN, Maoists, anarchists, Red Brigades, Japanese 
Red Army) strive to replace capitalists with socialist/communists regime “dictatorship of proletariat”. Right-
wind (e.g. skinheads, racist groups, Neo-Nazi, Neo-Fascist) seek to change democratic governments by a 
dictatorship.  
This category also featured can include ecological and anti-globalization movements. Political-religious 
groups (e.g. al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas, Al-Jihad al-Islami, Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen, Jihad Islamic) fight 
with all who do not belong to their political and religious factions.12 Groups based on Islamic 
fundamentalism are the biggest threat at present. From XXI century numbers of Islamic group is growing. 
These groups are situated and operate in many countries, e.g. Al Qaeda operates in 60 countries.  
List of international terrorist groups developed by EC and by National Counterterrorism Center is in Anex1.  
Terrorist organisations constantly recruit people of different nationalities to their ranks, and over last decades 
a new generation of terrorists is arising, much better trained in information and telecommunications 
technologies, use violence on much scale and with the potential use of weapons of mass destruction.  
Basic motivations for this groups are: action to demonstrate their skills in order to occur in social 
consciousness, persecution of others, make revenge and retaliation, intimidating actions aimed at a group of 
people to force the action corresponding to the interests of the terrorists, steps to victory over the opponent, 
action to destruction of any human community and activities aimed at the destruction of any human 
population.13 
Targets selected by terrorist groups depend of their goals, but choice of their attacks in many cases depends 
on opportunity to achieve high losses of human life with minimal risks to the attackers, as well as, or inflict 
more damage to governmental institutions and to economy.  
Terrorist groups usually are intended to influence an audience and more often attacks concern civilian 
systems than military targets, which are generally much better protected.  
By choosing energy power system as a target, terrorists can relatively easy reach their goals, taking into 
account the fact that society life depends on electricity. Moreover, the electric power system is linked up 
with every other civilian infrastructure (transportation, communication, food production, public health) that 
are able to effectively operate without electricity supply in a short time. Larger power outages may be 
difficult and time consuming to restore, moreover single point failure in energy system linkage to other 
critical infrastructure and increase scale of attack. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
11 European Security Strategy of 12 December 2003 
12 P.Toft, A.Duero. A. Bieliauskas: Terrorists targeting and energy security. Institute of Energy, JRC of EC, Pette n,.Elsevier 2010 
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By blowing a substation or transmission lines terrorists could cause cascading failures and damage parts that 
would take months to repair or replace. 
Terrorist groups also often choose as targets the energy transmission infrastructure.  
From 139 active nationalist-separatist terrorist groups 22 attacked energy transmission infrastructure (16%), 
and respectively from 124 secular-utopias 9 groups chose energy infrastructure, and 9 groups from 119 
political - religions groups. 14 
Total number of terrorists group attacking energy transmission infrastructure is presented on the next figure.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
13 B. Hołyst , Terroryzm, Lexi-Nexis, Polska 2011. 
14 P.Toft, A.Duero. A. Bieliauskas: Terrorists targeting and energy security. Institute of Energy, JRC of EC, Petten,.Elsevier 2 010 
Figure 1: World terrorist groups and number of attackers for energy transmission infrastructure 
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According to National Counter Terrorism Center there are several countries such as Iran, Cuba, Sudan, and 
Syria which sponsored terrorism. Without state sponsors, these groups would have greater difficulty 
obtaining funds, weapons, materials, and secure areas they require to plan and conduct operations. 
Altogether, there were 47 international terrorist groups.  
In 2001, 3,295 people were killed, while in 2004 6,060 people lost their lives as a result of terrorist attacks. 
15. 
3.1.1 Internet use by terrorists 
Globalization, including easy access to communication, Internet, media, and transportation has enabled 
larger-scale operations by criminals and terrorists around the world. 
Presently Internet becomes a tool increasingly used by terrorists, and allows them to extend their range of 
worldwide activities. Terrorists use Internet and popular media network to do their campaign of propaganda, 
psychological operations, as well as, to disseminate false and manipulate information. Using Internet they 
can promote their own ideology on a global scale to reach the audiences around the world. By using a global 
network of Internet connections terrorist organizations coordinate their actions with different parts of the 
world. In addition, compared to the very expensive network security techniques, cost of preparation and 
implementation of computer attack is irrelevant.  
The Internet is also a source of information and has become for terrorists one of the main tools as source of 
data about objects which potentially can be goals of their attacks. 
Terrorists groups can easily use the Internet to gather detailed information on the electric system worldwide, 
identify the position of weak points of the system (location transformers, cooling system in nuclear power 
plants, etc.) and select their entrance. The internet: GPS Maps, Google Maps, and others geographic 
programs, give detailed information on different part of an electric power system. Available satellite data 
combined with direct observation on the ground allows to trace individual parts of the system and to prepare 
detailed plans for attacks. 
Another advantage of the combat information is negligible risk to the attackers because of the possibility of 
attacks from long distances. The action can be performed with commercially available terminal located e.g. 
in the internet cafe, and chances of capturing the perpetrators of the act are slim.  
                                                 
15 http://www.nctc.gov/site/other/fto.html 
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3.1.2 The electric system as a potential terrorists target  
The electric systems are exposed to cyber and physical threats of different nature. Cyber threats are attacks 
on control and communication system which may cause SCADA/EMS or other cyber assets failure or 
malfunction.  
The main physical threats are faulty equipment, aging, exploited material used in various processes, random 
accidents, malfunctioning of an automatic protection system, natural events like storms, floods, fires, 
hurricanes or earthquakes, or intentional deliberate attacks. 
Main difference between natural disaster and deliberate attack to power system is that terrorists select the 
critical components and the most vulnerable parts of the system and equipment as targets. Great danger is 
also a high likelihood of an attack with the use of chemical and biological weapons. Often consequences of 
terrorists attack could be much more dramatic, when a combined cyber attack and a physical attack on 
several vulnerabilities contribute simultaneously, particularly effected by terrorists with great knowledge of 
the electric system. Additionally an attack during a period with extreme weather might lead to deaths of 
many people. 
Threats can be incidental or results of malicious behaviour of attackers. Still a lot of threats result from 
human errors or insufficient understanding of procedures.  
Another threat is potential loss of domestic or imported fuel supply as result of political and/or military 
actions, embargoes, transmission, and transportations problems. Such cases may lead to limitation of energy 
fuels, not sufficient fuel quality, and as consequence, to further disruptions of the operation of the electric ity 
infrastructure. 
Power system by its nature (geographic extent and dynamism) sometimes is not reliable, but is designed to 
resist a variety of natural disruption and continue to operate. Most of the outages are local and losses are not 
significant. Large scale power disruption can cause regional or international cascading power failure 
(blackouts) and affect millions customers.  
Examples of blackouts of European power system and their impacts to society in number of affecting people 
are presented in the following table. 
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Table 1: blackouts of European power system and their impacts  
 Country Date Number of affecting people 
1.  
2. 
3. 
4.  
5. 
6.  
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Denmark 
France 
Portugal 
Denmark 
England, London 
Denmark, Sweden 
Italy, Austria, France, 
Slovenia and Switzerland 
Germany, Münsterland 
Poland, Szczecin 
1999 
1999 
2000 
2003 
2003 
2003 
2003 
 
2005 
2008 
Power to 100 000 customers interrupted 
Power to 3,6 million customers interrupted 
Power to 5 million customers interrupted 
Power to 5 million customers interrupted 
Power to  410 000 customers interrupted 
Power to 5 million customers interrupted 
Power to 57 million customers interrupted 
 
Power to 80 000 customers interrupted 
Power to 500 000 customers interrupted 
Sources: Terrorism and the electric power system, NRC, USA, and  Structure of Energy Sector Control Centers: Analysis of the Different Levels and 
Uses of Control Centers in the Energy System (Electricity and Natural Gas), Octavio: Energy System Control Centers Security, an EU Approach, 
March 2009. 
Minutes lost per customer per year in European Union countries in 1999-2007 due to system supply 
interruptions shows Figure 2.16  
 
Fig. 2.  Electricity supply interuptions in minutes per year in EU countries 
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Figure 2: Electricity supply interruptions in minutes per year in EU countries  
 
                                                 
16 4th Benchmarking Report, on Quality of Electricity Supply 2008, Council of the European Energy Regulators, December 2008, pp. 177, ( 
www.energy-regulator.eu )) 
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Power system is an attractive target for terrorists because of its size and imperfections in security and is very 
vulnerable to attack. System control centers, generators and auxiliary equipment, high voltage substations, 
large power transmission lines and towers are goals of potential attacks and they can all bring significant 
economic, political, social and media effects. Even small terrorist groups with minimal resources can 
potentially achieve major effects.  
The most common types of attacks are: bombing, (vehicle bomb, person-borne/delivered), person followed 
by armed attack, letters, parcels or packages containing an explosive, arson and vandalism.  
Typical methods of electronic attack are: malicious software (Malware) viruses, Trojan horses, worms, 
spyware, hacking, phishing, denial of service (DoS), IP spoofing, replay attack and man in the middle attack. 
Many physical attacks on electric system have been documented around the world over the last few decades. 
For example, a database for 27 countries outside USA for the period 1994-2004 reported a total number of 
about 192 terrorist attacks. Among them, about 58% of the attacks took place in Colombia, 8% in Iraq and 
6% in Spain, 3% in Russia, Pakistan and France. Remaining 21 countries accounted together for 19%. About 
59 % of the attacks were targeted at electricity transmission, 13% at substations and 12% at power 
generation. 17 
Another source “The Energy Incident Data Base R. Mullen” indicate ca. 2500 attacks that have been 
conducted against transmission lines and towers in various parts of the world over 1996-2006. Also, 
substations and switchyards were attacked more than 500 times over the same period.  18   
Transmission and distribution lines are relatively easy to attack, and have been historically most often 
selected as targets for terrorist attacks, followed by towers and high voltage substations. Increased use of ICT 
and deep interdependence of electric system and communications infrastructure makes control centers 
especially vulnerable to physical and cyber attacks. 
A significant number of terrorist attacks and military power on the system took place in Iraq, aimed at targets 
as power plants and transmission and distribution equipment facilities (also across Asia, e.g. in Thailand, 
additionally many examples come from Africa).  
In the last decades physical attacks on the European electric system have occurred the most frequently, but 
have been restricted to small groups with limited technical knowledge and affecting some parts of system, 
but the probability of large attack to EU power system is high. Recent terrorist attacks in Europe (in Madrid 
and London) have increased risk of similar attacks directly on the European electric infrastructure. More and 
more data regarding electric power grid have been available to any individual worldwide, so it is possible to 
fulfil an attack even on several targets at the same time. 
                                                 
17 R. Zimmerman, C. Restrepo, N. Dooskin, J. Freyissinet, R. Hartwell, J. Mille, W. Remingto: Diagnostic tools to estimate conse quences of 
terrorism attacks against critical infrastructure. Center for Rik and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events, University of So uthern California, LA, 
California, draft report #05-014, May 31, 2005. pp. 66. 
18 Terrorism and electric power delivery syst em, National Academy of Sciences.2012  
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An example of frequent terrorists attacks in Europe was Algerian war in XX century where power energy 
plants, substations and lines were attacked by OAS.  Also, the Irish Republican Army detonated bombs on 
power substations in the United Kingdom in the past. Terrorism related to the activity of the Irish Republican 
Army is still a serious threat in the Northern Ireland, and unfortunately in spite of peace process and 
settlement being reached at the government level, there are still frequent major social unrest and street 
actions, and in the recent time direct attacks on uniformed service personnel.  
A classification of potential power system attackers would be:19  
1. Malicious “hackers” with substantial knowledge of the system who want to demonstrate their skills 
in order to occur in social consciousness. They don’t care much about negative consequences. They 
can be insiders or outsiders.  
2. Disgruntled individuals or groups who want to harm a power system, but not to kill a lot of people, 
or cause wide societal damage. They attack in revenge or retaliation utilities or staff, sometimes as 
an act of vandalism; sometimes they attack for some symbolic reason e.g. eco-terrorists. They can be 
insiders with substantial knowledge of the system or outsiders.  
3. Individuals or small low-tech groups with limited resources who want to kill a lot of people or cause 
wide social damage or harm. 
4. Terrorists groups with significant capabilities and resources set to kill a lot of people or cause wide 
social damage or harm. In this approach, power system can be primary or subsequent to the primary 
objective is to force the measures appropriate to the interests of the terrorist group.  
5. Participants in power markets seeking economic advantage by disrupting the operations of other 
market players. They include knowledgeable employees of the attacked firm assisting the attacking 
entity. They can be knowledgeable employees as well as knowledgeable outsiders working for 
assisting the attacking entity. 
Electric power system may be potential target for criminal activity, in particular deliberate acts of vandalism, 
sabotage (which is closely related to terrorists act) and continue to be among the most likely targets for 
potential future attacks of any kind. 
                                                 
19 Terrorism and electric power delivery system, National Academy of Sciences.2012  
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3.2  How security standards provide ‘refuge’ against malicious attacks 
Disruption of the power system for a longer time can result in loss of lives and impose great economic costs. 
Usually deliberate attack is more violent and brings greater losses than equipment failures or accidents. 
There are many things that can be done by utilities, policy makers, regulators, and others to reduce 
vulnerability and make electric power system more resistant to terrorists attack.  
Any increase in reliability minimizes impact of potential terrorist attack and can cause the electric power 
system will be less interesting as a target for terrorist groups.  
Reliability of power systems can be enhanced by standards developing, by incorporating devices, 
redundancy and back-up systems and investments (but on the other hand this can decrease security through 
greater complexity). They all increase costs of activities and utilities cannot always afford them. 
Developing reliability standards shall be expensive to implement but considerably increases security of the 
system, what is a priority to utilities. 
Other measures to improve safety concern include extension of staff training, additional audits exchanging 
information on security by seminars, conferences, workshops, brochures, newsletters and they all are less 
expensive. 
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4 LIST CURRENT AND FUTURE THREATS  
Increases in the use of the Internet and in the interconnectivity of computers and computer-controlled 
facilities are revolutionizing the communication and business for people, governments, companies, 
organizations and the rest. There has been a host of benefits: people can get vast amounts of information 
about every topic imaginable, financial and business transactions are done almost instantaneously, 24 hours a 
day, and electronic mail, media websites and computer bulletins allow people to be informed about the world 
in real-time. Use of SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems allows communicating 
with systems, downloading real-time data and controlling their correct operation.   
Nevertheless, there are some drawbacks too: this connection between all the people, governments and 
infrastructures means risks to their computer systems, and so it does to the critical infrastructures and 
operations they carry out. These include telecommunications, power distribution systems, water supply, 
public health services, national defence, law enforcement, government services and emergency services. 
Communication and control of energy systems coexist with corporate IT environments, using in operation 
data from other systems, neighbouring control centers, substations or from some engineering systems and 
computers. Such interconnections, along with the grids size and its physical exposure create vulnerabilities 
and risk of hacking and cyber attacks. The ease and speed of the access is then a double-edged knife as it 
allow individuals and organisations to interfere with these operations from remote locations for malicious 
purposes, such as sabotage and fraud.  
Cyber threats can be divided into intentional or unintentional. Unintentional threats include disruption of the 
system due to software upgrades or maintenance procedures, which cause the damage without intention. In 
this work, only intentional threats will be studied.  
Possible attackers to energy systems are very different in organization, knowledge and motivation. The 
following table shows a classification of these attackers. Anyway, it is not a definitive classification, as 
threats are continuously growing and evolving20: 
  
 
                                                 
20 Stouffer K., Falco J.,  Scarfone K.: National Institute of Standards and Technology, Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security, 
Gaithersburg, 2011 
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Table 2 : Threats classification 
Threat Description 
Criminal groups Criminal groups are using more and more cyber intrusions mainly to gain money. For example, the y 
could try to get confidential information from companies to commit identity theft, or to blackmail 
them, or to extort them by threatening the dissemination of sensible information (or by merely 
demonstrating that they are able to do damage and demanding a ransom), or commit fraud, or 
forgery (changing values in bills, for example).   
Foreign 
intelligence 
services 
Foreign intelligence services can use cyber intrusions to gather information or espionage. Several 
nations are trying to develop information warfare methods, programs and abilities. These methods 
can impact seriously on the supply, communication or economic infrastructures of the other 
country, affecting citizens and military power.  
Hackers They have certain knowledge about computers and communication systems, and they can break into 
systems violating the security measures. Sometimes hackers crack into networks for the thrill of the 
challenge or to boast in the hacker community. Others hack into systems to take revenge, stalking 
or to gain money.  Although cyber security is increasing, hacking programmes are becoming more 
sophisticated and easy to use, so even hackers who have not extensive computer abilities can 
download programmes and attack their victims.    
Hacktivists They are politically-motivated hackers who attack publicly accessible web pages to send a political 
message and e-mail servers to overload them.   
Insiders Dissatisfied employees, outsourcing vendors and other people who have permission and physical 
and cyber access to the sys tem facilities. As they know the target system, they do not need very 
much knowledge of computer intrusion. They can cause damage or steal system data. Insiders 
include also contractors hired by the company and poorly trained employees who can 
unintentionally install malware in the systems.  
Spyware and 
malware writers 
Individuals or organisations who write malicious code designed specifically to damage or disrupt a 
software: viruses, worms, Trojan horses, etc.  
Phishers Individuals or groups who carry out phishing attacks trying to steal identities or information to gain 
money. They can use spam, spyware or malware too.   
Spammers Individuals or groups who distribute spam (undesired e-mail) using a false or hidden identity to sell 
products, conduct phishing attacks, introduce spyware or malware, or attack the system.  
Bot-network 
operators 
A bot-network consists of some computers whose defences have been broken and whose control 
has been taken over by the attacker. Each computer is called a “bot”, and is  created when it is 
penetrated by malware. Generally, bot-networks are used to coordinate attacks, and to send spam, 
malware attacks and phishing attacks to other computers. Sometimes, a spammer purchases the 
services of a bot-network and pays the operator for sending publicity.  
Terrorist groups They attack unlawfully persons or property to coerce a government, the civilian population or a 
segment of them, to get political or social objectives, cause mass damages or weaken the economy. 
They can use phishing attacks or spyware and malware attacks to gather information or obtain 
money.      
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Typical methods of cyber attack to energy system are: malicious software (Malware) viruses, Trojan horses, 
worms, spyware, hacking, phishing, denial of service (DoS), IP spoofing, replay attack, man in the middle 
attack.  However, during recent years there appeared a new type of dangerous attacks - bot installation.  They 
are launched by a new type of hackers – bot-network operators that invade and take over multiple systems to 
coordinate and distribute attacks, or use the invaded and remotely controlled computers as illegal storage and 
processing devices.21 The following is a detailed description of these methods. 
4.1  Social engineering 
Social engineering is a technique used by attackers to gain system access or information by exploiting the 
basic human instinct to be helpful. In most cases, social engineering is successful since the penetrated utility 
personnel are not aware enough of security-related duties and responsibilities. As a result cyber attacks based 
on information gained by social engineering can steal personal data (e.g., passwords, logins), enter a SCADA 
database, and made undesirable data manipulation and remote control operations.22 
4.2 Malware: viruses, Trojan horses, worms, spyware  
Malware is a short for malicious software, and covers files and programs installed without owner’s 
knowledge and permission to infiltrate a computer system and gather information such as passwords, scan 
drives, upload and download data. Malware spread by email, some websites, by CD, DVD, or USB drive or 
from infected computers also to whole network. Typical examples of malware are viruses, Trojan horses, 
worms, and spyware.   
4.3 Viruses 
A Virus is a malicious code that can copy itself into a host computer system. More specifically, it replicates 
itself into operating systems and programs and modifies them in a way that is harmful towards the user. 
When a user runs the infected host, he causes the virus code to run also, and execute its programmed 
mission. The virus can only spread from one computer to another in the form of an executable code. For 
instance, a user sends it over a network or the Internet, or carries it on a removable medium such as a floppy, 
CD, DVD, or USB drive.  
When viruses are executed they may cause harm to computer system's hosted data (viruses in order to seek 
needed information almost always corrupt or modify files on a targeted computer), functional performance, 
or networking throughput. They can cause from minor disruption to major malfunction or service disruption, 
even erase everything on a hard disk. Sometimes, viruses install a backdoor on the infected system that 
                                                 
21 H. Jormakka, P. Koponen, H. Pentikainen, H. Bartoszewicz-Burczy: On managing physical and cyber threats to energy system identification and 
countermeasure requirements” Maintenance and Reliability no 3 (47) 2010.  
22 A. Babś, H. Bartoszewicz-Burczy, J. Świderski: Guidelines to classify threats and damages (physical and cyber). Net Protection CIPS project. 
IEN, 2011. 
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allows the attacker to control the system. These attacks are very dangerous because of the impact they can 
produce, such as the unavailability of the HMI used by the operators to control the plant processes and the 
corruption of the process historian. Even more so, since all the control traffic between the network and the 
remote sites passes through the Intranet, all this traffic would be affected by the attack, hindering the remote 
maintenance and control of the plant process network.  
On the other hand, viruses can attack the process network, which hosts the whole set of SCADA system, that 
is, the systems that control the RTU in the field network and control the entire system. These systems are 
communicated with the field RTU by means of protocols like ModBUS, DNP3, OPC and Profibus. Common 
viruses can cause the reboot of field devices using Ethernet connections or saturate the bandwidth between 
master and slaves of the SCADA system, de-synchronising master and slaves. Other viruses can corrupt the 
SCADA masters, what can take a long time to restore. A few viruses are able to directly communicate with 
the field devices, taking over the function of the SCADA systems. These viruses are critical, because an 
attacker could take the complete control of the system. Antivirus software is the most useful tool against this 
threat. However, even an updated antivirus can be attacked by some viruses released between the issue of the 
virus code and the release of the antivirus code update. 
4.4  Trojan horses 
Trojan horses are designed to allow hackers a remote access to target computer systems. They are computer 
programs that apparently have a useful function, but hide a malicious function which can avoid security 
mechanisms. In case a Trojan horse has been installed on a target computer system, it is possible for a hacker 
to access this system remotely and perform various undesired and harmful operations. The range of 
operations that can be performed by a hacker depend on user privileges on a target computer system and 
design of the Trojan horse.  
Trojan horses are similar to virus, except that it does not propagate itself as a virus does. 
In October 2011 Budapest University of Technology and Economics alerted on Duqu, Trojan designed to 
collect intelligence about its targets. Duqu has been confirmed in several countries in this in: France, 
Netherlands, Switzerland, Ukraine, Iran, India, United Kingdom.23 
4.5  Computer worm 
A computer worm is a malware that is a self-replicating computer programme, and it is sent out to computers 
on the network. The computer worm activity is carried out without any user intervention. Unlike a virus, a 
computer worm does not need to attach itself to an existing program. The worm uses system memory and 
network bandwidth, thus overloading Web servers, network servers, and individual computers and making 
all operation slow down. They can also delete files on a host system. 
                                                 
23 
http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_duqu_the_precursor_to_the_next_stuxn
et.pdf  
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Several destructive computer viruses and worms have attacked electric system including: Slammer, Stuxnet 
Flamer, and others.  
In 2003, the Slammer virus, attacked the MS SQL database Scada system, and stopped for five hours of 
safety systems of nuclear power plants David-Besse in Ohio.  Slammer entered to David Besse plant through 
the unsecured contractor network. 
The Stuxnet virus was first detected in 2010 and showed, that a cyber attack could also cause significant 
physical damage to a facility targets.  More than one thousand devices in the Iranian plant in Natanz next to a 
nuclear power plant in Bushehr were destroyed.  That shows that future malware, modeled on Stuxnet, could 
target energy infrastructure - such as power plants, sustations in Europe as well. 
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4.6 Spyware 
Spyware is a malware that is installed on target computers in order to steal sensitive information (user ID, 
password), also collect information about computer users (favorite Website) as well as copying data from 
hard drives without their knowledge. The presence of spyware is often hidden from the user. Spyware 
programs not only can collect various types of personal information but can also interfere with user control 
of the computer in other ways.  
4.7  Denial of Service (DoS)  
A Denial of Service is a deliberate limit or denial of access to resources. It is a hacker attack that is aimed at 
disrupting computer or website normal function to make it unavailable to its intended users. In this way, the 
attacker can limit or deny access to specific resources, such as company Intranets or power plant networks, 
or public services as file transfer servers or websites. In general, DoS attacks are implemented by either 
forcing the targeted computer to reset (using a design or implementation flaw discovered by the attacker), or 
consuming its resources so that it can no longer provide its intended service or obstructing the 
communication media between the intended users and the attacked computer so that they can no longer 
communicate adequately. One common method of the attack involves saturating the target computer with 
external communications requests, such that it cannot respond to legitimate traffic, or responds slowly 
making it unable to provide operation.24. Other possibility is discovering an implementation flaw. When the 
attacker sends a malicious request to the Web Service, it causes an abnormal consumption of memory, and 
the unavailability of the service. These attacks are dangerous because they can avoid the maintenance and 
operation of some facilities, which often can be made remotely using SCADA systems, a site-to-site VPN 
connection and a RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial in User Service). These systems allow the remote 
operators to act as if they were local by downgrading. An attacker could make impossible to access to the 
system information, to check the state of the system and it would not be possible to operate it in case of 
emergency. The importance of the attack depends on the target, the duration of the attack and the minimum 
service requirements. It must also be considered possible domino effects with other systems and services 
which depend on the attacked service.   
4.8 Distributed Denial of Service 
A Distributed Denial of Service attack (DDoS attack) is an attack that consists of a certain number of 
simultaneous DoS attacks aimed at a single target computer system and performed by different computers. 
As a result resources of the targeted computer system can no longer be used to provide its intended service.  
                                                 
24 A. Babś, H. Bartoszewicz-Burczy, J. Świderski: Guidelines to classify threats and damages (physical and cyber). Net Protection CIPS project. 
IEN, 2011. 
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4.9 Permanent Denial of Service 
A Permanent Denial of Service (PDoS), also known as phlashing, is an attack that damages a computer 
system or computer-based device in a way that this system/device requires replacement or reinstallation of 
hardware. Usually PDoS attacks use secure access connections which allow remote administration of such 
devices as routers, printers, or other networking hardware. The attacker replaces a device's firmware with a 
modified, corrupted, or defective firmware image. This makes the device unusable for its original purpose 
until it can be repaired or replaced.  
4.10 IP spoofing or stealth of Domain Credential 
IP address spoofing (IP spoofing) is accomplished when a hacker uses a discovered IP address as its source 
address to gain access to the protected computer system. The valid IP address can be obtained by a hacker in 
a variety of ways including snooping and social engineering. This type of attack is most effective where trust 
relationships exist between machines. For example, it is common for some corporate networks to have 
internal systems trust one another, so that users can log in without a username or password provided they are 
connecting from another machine on the internal network. Creating a connection from a trusted machine, an 
attacker may be able to access the target machine without an authentication (undesirable remote access to 
substation SCADA/IDEs is possible e.g. by using r-services – remote-login (rlogin), remote-shell (rsh))25. 
Once the attacker has obtained the IP address, he can make a direct cryptanalysis and sniff the data traffic in 
the network. Moreover, he can reject any remote log-in request.  
4.11 Replay attack  
A replay attack occurs when a hacker intercepts a communication between two parties and replays the 
transaction. For example, a hacker might intercept a data transaction between a SCADA dispatching center 
and a substation SCADA. The hacker then replays the transaction in order to perform substation control or 
data theft.  
4.12 Man in the middle  
A man in the middle attack (MITM) is an attack during which the attacker makes independent connections 
with communicating computer systems (e.g. with SCADA at the dispatching center and with the substation 
SCADA) and relays messages between these systems, making them believe that they are  communicating 
directly to each other over a private connection, when in fact the entire conversation is controlled by the 
attacker. The attacker could also capture messages from a system, modify its content and sent it to the 
receiver.  
                                                 
25 A. Babś, H. Bartoszewicz-Burczy, J. Świderski: Guidelines to classify threats and damages (physical and cyber). Net Protection CIPS project. IEN, 2011. 
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4.13 Cross-site scripting 
The attacker uses a third party authentic website, to run their program within the victim’s computer. The 
attacker creates a malicious website or link in a legitimate website. When the victim clicks it, the attacker 
can discover vulnerabilities, steal cookies (data exchanged between web servers and browsers), log into 
keystroke (this is, register the passwords typed by the user on his keyboard), capture screen shots, collect 
information and remotely access and control the machine.      
4.14 Phishing attacks and local DNS poisoning 
They are used to gather information from legitimate users by making them connect to a malicious website, 
by means of a faked e-mail or a link. The access to this website is set in such a way as to make them believe 
to be connected to a legitimate website. Consequently, a legitimate user could supply sensitive data or login 
credentials to a malicious website.  
Another possibility is transparently re-routing the user to a fake server created by the attacker. In this way, 
the attacker can provide the operator with a false picture of the system, or obtain the operator credentials and 
then have direct access to the SCADA system to attack it. The best attacks re-route the user to the legitimate 
website after stealing the credentials. In this way, it is very difficult for the user to discover the attackers. 
This attack impacts directly on the maintenance and management of the system, since the attacker could use 
the credential of an internal user to create a big damage. He could access to protected information and learn 
about anomalies.        
In both cases, some social engineering is needed: to send a faked e-mail and succeed in the attack, it should 
look like a legitimate official e-mail. In the second case, to re-route the user it is necessary to know the user s´ 
Domain Name Servers. Besides, the target websites must be accessible to the attacker, to learn what it looks 
like (logos, letter font, graphical aspect) and the language. The way the user is asked to enter has to be 
known by the attacker, too.   
Actually, these attacks cannot cause any power disturbance, but they can ease further attacks, combining 
physical and cyber acts, which could cause big damages. For example, the attacker could take advantage of 
discovering an emergency situation to carry out a bigger attack.    
4.15 Logic bombs 
They are pieces of code inserted into a software system, that can start a malicious function when one or more 
specified conditions are fulfilled.  
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4.16 Passive wiretapping 
Some data, such as passwords, are monitored or recorded when they are transmitted over a communications 
link, without changing the data.   
4.17 Structured Query Language (SQL) injection 
It is an attack that causes the alteration of a database search in a website. This can be used to get 
unauthorized access to information in a database.  
4.18 War dialing and war driving 
The attacker detects connections to the system by surrounding wireless-equipped computer, detecting their 
phone number. War driving is similar, but the attacker drives a car through cities and neighborhoods carrying 
a wireless-equipped computer that can find unsecured wireless networks.  
4.19 Scanning 
The attacker captures a message which is being sent in a wireless network, and scans the destination IP 
addresses. In this way, he can determine the service ports on the receiver machine that are running or in 
listening state to connect to access points.    
4.20 Zero-day exploit 
This attack takes advantage of security vulnerabilities that are unknown to the general public. Sometimes, 
the code is written by the discoverer of the vulnerability. It is then a potent threat because in the time interval 
between the first attacks and the creation of defenses there are no protections.  
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4.21 Password cracking 
The attacker uses a program which repeatedly tries to guess the password to access to a system.   
All described methods of attack can be dangerous for SCADA systems as they could allow unwanted access 
to systems, manipulate data as well as spread across the network. 
Hardware and software components (or security subsystems) make use of security architecture: 
 Firewalls, DeMilitarized Zones (DMZs) and proxy servers, 
 Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPSs), 
 Cryptographic techniques including: 
 Data content confidentiality, 
 Data integrity, digital signatures and digital certificates, 
 Authentication mechanisms, 
 Anti-malware software (anti -virus, -trojan, -warm, -spyware programs) 
4.22 Bot-Net 
A Botnet is a network of compromised (hacked) computers (bots) with installed malicious software, which is 
controlled by a botnet-operator (command- and-control-server, C&C). If used for criminal purposes, the bot 
malicious is usually installed without the knowledge of the computer-owner. 
Botnet operators are attackers, they can invade and take over multiple systems to coordinate and distribute 
attacks, sending spam, or use the invaded and remotely controlled computers as illegal storage and 
processing devices.  They use C&C software, to forward repetitive operating tasks to other computers on the 
Internet (bots), which is independently i.e. no interaction with a computer-owner is necessary. 
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5 EVALUATION OF THREATS TO THE CONTROL SYSTEMS OF A POWER NETWORK  
Risk assessment and management are essential to confront, minimize and prevent terrorist acts, and empower 
security agencies. To do this, the first step is to consider what can be threatened and must be protected. 
These assets are called critical infrastructures and include agriculture, banking and finance, chemical and 
hazardous waste, defense, etc., but one of the most important is the energy sector.  
In the past, terrorists attacked mostly physical objectives and infrastructures, but nowadays it could be easier 
and safer for them to carry out a cyber-attack, and the damage achieved could be bigger. For instance, 
attacking a single bank could only cause loss of the money in the bank strongbox, but blocking the bank 
communication could stop all the operations which were being carried out, not only in a single bank, but also 
in many other offices.      
In a risk assessment, the vulnerability of the infrastructures must be analyzed, critical functions and facilities 
identified, and their security improved. Even though it is impossible to protect every possible target, it is 
clear that the more difficult it is for terrorists to attack facilities, the less likely these attacks are.  
Another point to be considered is that if security in the most attractive facilities makes a successful attack 
very difficult, terrorists could choose a nearby facility that can be less attractive, but has a higher probability 
of success on account of inappropriate security. In general, the probability of a terrorist attack cannot be 
evaluated as terrorism is random.  
The evaluation of critical infrastructures and assets should be ongoing, maintaining and updating databases 
on critical assets and vulnerable infrastructures. Although this evaluation can seem overwhelming, it is 
essential to improve public safety. Assessments must be made not only as a routine but also their 
effectiveness against attacks should be checked.   
In the next pages, the general methodology to carry out threat assessments will be commented, along with an 
example of a real assessment method: the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (N.I.P.P.), launched in the 
United States of America26.     
 
                                                 
26 United States Department of Homeland Security (2009). National Infrastructure Protection Plan. Partnering to enhance protection and resiliency.   
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Table 3: National Infrastructure Protection Plan (EEUU) 
THE NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PLAN (N.I.P.P.) 
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (N.I.P.P.) was released in 2006 in the U.S.A., and has 
been updated in a new version published in 2009. The goal of this plan is to “Build a safer, more 
secure, and more resilient America by preventing, deterring, neutralizing, or mitigating the effects of 
deliberate efforts by terrorists to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit elements of our Nation’s Critical 
Infrastructures and Key Resources (C.I.K.R.) and to strengthen national preparedness, timely 
response, and rapid recovery of C.I.K.R. in the event of an attack, natural disaster, or other 
emergency”. C.I.K.R.s include “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United 
States that the incapacitation or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating 
impact on national security, national economic security, public health or safety, or any combinations 
of those matters”.   
Although it is not specially focused on power assets, it is a very clear framework to carry out a threat 
assessment. The N.I.P.P. helps administrations and private sector focus their efforts on areas where 
they can produce the most benefit to reduce vulnerabilities, threats and consequences of terrorist 
attacks. This program has been based on existing public and private sector protective programs to be 
cost-effective and to minimize the burden on owners and operators.       
On the one hand, this plan provides guidance to carry out risk assessments, but on the other hand it 
creates a framework to integrate initiatives developed by different users to create a national common 
strategy.   
 
A risk assessment and management approach consists of these steps: 
1) Study and description of the system and cyber security modeling: Learn what the system is like and 
the way it works. 
2) Criticality assessment: Identify and classify important or critical assets, and calculate criticality, or 
the damage that the destruction or malfunction of the asset could cause in the system. 
3) Threat assessment: Identify and evaluate existing or potential threats to an asset.  
4) Vulnerability assessment: Evaluate the weaknesses of an asset, or the ease to be attacked.  
5) Risk calculation: Risk combines into a variable criticality, threat and vulnerability, so it is very 
useful to evaluate damage to the asset and probability of the attack.   
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Table 4: NIPP Risk Assessment methodology 
N.I.P.P. RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY: STEPS 
The N.I.P.P. risk assessment methodology consists of the following steps: 
1) Set goals and objectives: Define the objectives and outcomes that will make up an effective risk 
assessment methodology.  
2) Identify assets, systems and networks: Carry out an inventory of the assets, systems and networks, which 
are C.I.K.R.s or contribute to the critical functionality, and gather information on these assets.  
3) Assess risks: Evaluate the risk, according to direct and indirect consequences of the attack, vulnerabilities 
to the attack and general or specific threat information.  
4) Prioritize: Aggregate and compare results to get a reliable view of the importance of each asset, system or 
network risk, and the mission continuity if the damage finally is produced. Establish priorities according to 
risks, and determine appropriate protection measures to get the biggest return. 
5) Implement protective programs and resiliency strategies: Select actions or programs to minimize the risk, 
identify and provide resources to solve priorities.   
6) Measure effectiveness: Evaluate it at the appropriate sector: national, State, local, regional to measure 
progress and determine if the measures are effective.  
This process must be ongoing, so that Federal Government and users can measure progress and take 
corrective measures to improve the asset protection over time.       
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5.1. Study and description of the system and cyber security modeling: 
The whole electric network must be analyzed to acquire information about the system and the way it works. 
Digital systems configuration and data flow must be identified and studied to create a model and establish 
the appropriate cyber security. As there are several systems, interacting all together, the exact location of all 
the systems in the site’s digital environment and interfaces with other assets should be known. In general, the 
following facts can be taken into account to prepare the model: 
 Any redundancy could be simplified as a single system. 
 One-to-one direct data communication, analog input-output and digital input-output may be simplified 
or excluded. 
 It is necessary to know the mechanism and direction of the data transfer.  
 Security controls already working, such as firewalls, intrusion prevention systems (IPS), intrusion 
detections systems (IDS), encryption and data flow control status must be identified. 
 Possible access to the system from outside or through portable devices used for maintenance should be 
known.  
It is necessary to identify: 
 Relevant assets, ways to control the system (human workers, hardware, software and information assets, 
subsystems and components, interfaces). 
 Data circulation between different assets or parts of the electric system.  
 System operational context: different usage states, procedures and conditions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rapporto Tecnico, Anno 8, n.48; Novembre 2013                                                                         
 
 
 
                                     41                                                           
5.2 Criticality assessment: 
5.2.1) Critical infrastructure and asset list: 
A criticality assessment is a systematic work to identify and evaluate important or critical assets, and the 
impact of an attack. It helps specialists calculate the relative importance or value of assets and divide 
resources up amongst the most critical assets. 
It is essential to determine the results of loss or damage to important systems and assets (including loss  of 
time), as well as the effort and control and management functions needed to solve the problem. For cyber 
assets, some of these damages could be loss in confidentiality, integrity or availability. Measuring criticality 
determines the importance of the asset. For example, damage to essential assets or loss of symbolic assets 
would denote a big importance.  
Assessing criticality can involve some subjectivity. The energy sector is inherently vulnerable and should be 
considered as critical infrastructure and key assets. 
To classify assets, it is necessary to evaluate if a loss of confidentiality, integrity or availability caused by 
cyber-attacks could reduce the security of the electric system. A useful classification could be based on the 
following: 
 Level 3: Assets associated with safety, which should be protected from malfunction of assets of minor 
importance. Redundant security controls and other mitigating measures should be applied. These assets 
can supply information to assets in lower levels, but not receive information from them.  
 Level 2: Assets which are not directly related to security, but may cause big damages or are connected 
to assets at level 3. These assets should not receive information from lower levels, but they can receive 
it from level 3 or supply it to level 1. Security controls and measures to reduce vulnerabilities can be 
applied.  
 Level 1: Independent assets or systems which cannot impact on the safety and are not connected to any 
network. The need for security controls and measures to reduce vulnerabilities depends on the impact of 
cyber-attacks on the asset itself.    
In accordance with NIPP assessment, Internet can be used as a key source of information, available for all 
sectors and comprising domestic and international assets within the Information and Communication 
technologies. D.H.S.  works with the S.S.A.s and C.I.K.R. partners to develop methodologies to identify 
cyber assets, systems and networks that can have consequences if they are destroyed, exploited or 
incapacitated. In this way, the dependence of the sector on cyber assets can be assessed. If a valid cyber 
identification methodology has already been developed by a sector, the N.I.P.P. ensures that it follows the 
N.I.P.P. risk management framework.   
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5.2.2) Calculating criticality: 
 
To estimate criticality, a five-point scale is used based on impact, damages and properties, interruption of the 
use of the facility or asset, or gain obtained by an attacker. This scale is as follows: 
 Extreme (5): Important damages or irreparable, permanent or prohibitive costly repair of a facility. 
Most items and assets are lost or destroyed and they are impossible to repair. The damage and loss of 
the system would provide the attacker with a big advantage: press coverage, political or tactical 
advantages. 
 High (4): Serious or costly damage to the assets is made, or a big advantage is got by the attacker. Some 
items cannot be repaired, but others remain intact.  
 Medium (3): The facility operations are disrupted for a moderate period of time. Repairs can be costly, 
but not result in significant loss of capability.  
 Low (2): There are minor damages to operations or facility capabilities, but they do not advantage the 
attacker. 
 Negligible (1): Insignificant loss or damage to facilities or operations.     
The most important are extreme and high criticality, especially when they appear along with a high threat 
and high vulnerability.  
5.3 Threat assessment: 
A threat assessment is defined by the United States Department of Homeland Security (D.H.S.)27 as “a 
systematic effort to identify and evaluate existing or potential terrorist threats to a jurisdiction and its target 
assets. Due to the difficulty in accurately assessing terrorist capabilities, intentions and tactics, threat 
assessments may yield only general information about potential risks.” 
Thus, a threat assessment implies doing a survey about attackers who can threat the energy sector in order to 
know who they are, their origin, how they are organized, their intention and reasons to carry out the attack, 
likely targets and moments to attack, planning activities they can do, the way they will attack and their 
capability to do it.   
The intelligence process is the basis of threat assessment, since the crime-related information can be used to 
evaluate and analyze terrorism and terrorist groups. Intelligence efforts can answer questions about the who, 
where, what, how and when of terrorism and terrorist groups.  
                                                 
27 https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/210680.pdf 
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This assessment needs an extensive and rigorous research and analysis, using information from police forces, 
country, local and private organizations and agencies, health services and emergency management 
organizations. For example, the crime rates in the surrounding area can be used as a measure of the type of 
criminal activity that may threaten the assets. The assessment must result in a high level of awareness and 
understanding of the changing threats. It should not be forgotten that threats are motivated by a variety of 
political and economic reasons.   
To carry out such an assessment, essential data to collect before doing it would include: 
 Classification of the attacker: Activist, terrorist, employee, hacker, etc. 
 Category of attacker: Foreign or domestic; terrorist or criminal; insider and/or outsider of the 
organization. 
 Purpose of the attacker: Theft, sabotage, mass destruction, sociopolitical objectives, etc.  
 Number of attackers for each category: Individual hacker, “cells” of operatives/terrorists, organized 
criminals, etc. 
 Target chosen by adversaries: Power stations, distribution lines, etc. 
 Type of planning activities needed to succeed in the attack : Long term “casing”, photography, 
monitoring police and security patrol patterns, etc. 
 Most likely or most damaging moment an attacker could attack : When more people are working in 
the facility, at rush hour, at night, when more people are using electricity, etc. 
 Range of attacker tactics : Stealth of credentials, virus infection, deceit, combination, etc. 
 Capabilities of attacker: Knowledge, motivation, skills, weapons and tools.  
Once these data have been collected, threat levels can be estimated based on a combination of the following 
factors: 
 Existence : A terrorist group or attacker is present or can access to a locality.  
 Capability: The capability of the terrorist group or attacker to attack has been demonstrated. 
 Intention: There is evidence of terrorist group or attacker activity, like stated or assessed intent to carry 
out terrorist activities, or attacks.  
 History: There has been terrorist activity in the past, or attacks. 
 Targeting: There is credible information or activity that shows preparations for attacks or terrorist 
operations (collection of information on likely objectives, preparation of destructive devices, etc.) 
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 Security environment: It indicates if and how the security and political measures affect the attackers or 
terrorists’ capabilities to attack.      
Similarly to criticality, threat is evaluated using a five-point scale: 
 Critical (5): Existence, capability and targeting are demonstrated, even if history and intentions are not. 
 High (4): Existence, capability, history and intentions are demonstrated, but not targeting. 
 Medium (3): Existence, capability and history are demonstrated, but not targeting or intentions. 
 Low (2): Existence and capability are demonstrated, but not history, targeting or intentions. 
 Negligible (1): Only existence or capability has been demonstrated, if the rest have not.  
Identifying a threat is very complex and difficult, and this process is often not understood or seen as 
unreachable. However, there are many resources within and outside the police forces, which should be 
correctly used.   
5.4 Vulnerability assessment:  
Vulnerability can be defined as “the identification of weaknesses in physical structures, personnel protection 
systems, processes, or other areas that may be exploited by terrorists”28. In this way, it is possible to evaluate 
the ease to attack the facility, because of good accessibility, good ways to get the location, bad protection of 
the site and lack of response forces or security measures. Another important factor will be the interest of 
attacking the system to a terrorist. Vulnerability assessment should be based on the system architecture, 
network design and system requirements. This includes all the computers, software platforms, networks, 
protocols and other resources required to control the grid and monitor its functions. Security features that are 
not present in the system, but should exist should be taken into account. Vulnerability can be difficult to be 
measured, but the following factors must be taken into account:  
 Location: Location of targets and facilities, ways to get in and out (public websites, company network). 
 Accessibility: How accessible a target is to the attacker, the ease of entrance, operation, information 
collection and response forces evasion.    
 Adequacy: Protection of storage facilities, effective denial of access to valuable or sensitive assets such 
as control systems and SCADAs which could be used to cause harm.  
 Availability: Availability of equipment, adequacy of response forces and of physical security measures.    
 
                                                 
28 D.H.S. (United States Department of Homeland Security),  https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/210680.pdf 
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The vulnerability is estimated using a five-point scale based on the protection and accessibility to the 
facilities: 
 Very highly vulnerable (5): There is a combination of two or more of the following: 
 Direct or easy access to the asset or facility. There are not passwords, or existence of a 
guess account which allows free access.  
 Asset or facility is open or uncontrolled, so attackers can collect information, operate 
and avoid responses. Access controls are easily avoided or provide incomplete coverage. 
 Response units cannot effectively counteract an experienced threat.  
 It is a very attractive target for potential terrorists.  
 Highly vulnerable (4): A combination of two or more of the following: 
 Easy access to the asset or facility. There exists a factory default password, what makes 
it easy to break it using social engineering.   
 Asset or facility is open or uncontrolled.  
 Response units cannot effectively counteract an experienced threat. 
 It is an attractive target for terrorists, with a big importance regionally or moderate 
importance globally.    
 Moderately vulnerable (3): A combination of two of the below: 
 Moderately difficult access to the asset or facility. There exists a short password, which 
is easy to guess, and password is valid for a long time.  
 Asset or facility is open or uncontrolled, but attackers can be detected, or find some 
resistance. Access to information and operation are hindered, but firewall systems, user 
authentication and Digital Certificates can be avoided or provide incomplete coverage. 
 Response units can counteract effectively an experienced level attack.  
 It is a moderately attractive target for terrorists, not well known outside the local area. 
 Lowly vulnerable (1): A combination of two or more of the below: 
 Very difficult access to asset or facility. It is not possible to change old passwords. They 
have a length bigger than 8 characters, combining 4 different categories. Passwords are 
changed at least each 3 months. There could be biometric identification.   
 Asset or facility is well controlled. There are Firewall systems, user authentication, user 
rights and privileges, and Digital Certificates for authentication of higher level users.  
 Adequate safeguards are taken to prevent and hinder access to sensitive materials. 
 Response units can answer an attack with suitable personnel, equipment and time.  
 It is not an attractive target for terrorists.  
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5.5 Risk calculation: 
 Risk can be defined as the extent to which an asset is exposed to a hazard or danger. It will be the ultimate 
measure of the importance of an asset or facility, as it groups not only the probability to be attacked but also 
the damage or loss an attack would produce.   
This calculation combines into one the three assessed variables: criticality, threat and vulnerability, to 
determine the risk of an asset, facility or group of assets. There are several techniques to evaluate risk, from 
qualitative to quantitative formulas. The most used method is based on the next equation: 
 
Risk= Threat x Vulnerability x Criticality 
 
Where: 
 Criticality: Measures the importance of an asset by calculating the impact if the asset is lost or harmed. 
 Threat: Measures the likelihood of an attack, based on the existence, capabilities and intention to attack 
of the terrorists and the ability to counteract them. 
 Vulnerability: Measures the weaknesses of the objectives, which the attacker could profit from.          
Threat times vulnerability can be seen as the probability of the attack, and criticality is related to the 
consequence of loss or damage to the critical asset.  
Using this method with a numerical scale can lead to a conclusion about the risk of the asset and the 
measures to be taken. The following is the most used method to classify assets. It is called Table Analysis.  
 Firstly, three square matrix (5x5) are drawn, each showing the relation between two of the variables 
criticality, threat and vulnerability.         
    
Threat Criticality Threat
Vulnerability 1 2 3 4 5 Vulnerability 1 2 3 4 5 Criticality 1 2 3 4 5
1 1 2 3 4 5 1 1 2 3 4 5 1 1 2 3 4 5
2 2 4 6 8 10 2 2 4 6 8 10 2 2 4 6 8 10
3 3 6 9 12 15 3 3 6 9 12 15 3 3 6 9 12 15
4 4 8 12 16 20 4 4 8 12 16 20 4 4 8 12 16 20
5 5 10 15 20 25 5 5 10 15 20 25 5 5 10 15 20 25  
Figure 3: Square matrixes showing relation between criticality, threat and vulnerability 
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Each color represents a different risk: 
  represents a very high risk (between 20 and 25). Countermeasures to mitigate the risk should be 
adopted immediately. 
  represents a high risk (between 15 and 19). Countermeasures to mitigate the risk should be adopted 
as soon as possible. 
  and   represent a moderate risk (in yellow for values between 10 and 14, and green for values 
between 5 and 9, the first considerably higher than the latter. Countermeasures to mitigate the risk 
should be planned in the near future.  
 represents a low risk (between 1 and 4). Countermeasures to mitigate the risk would increase security, 
but this risk is not as urgent as others.  
 
Combining the three variables, a cube can be drawn, with values ranging between 1 and 125. This cube is 
shown in the next figure. 
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Figure 4. Cube representing the risk due to criticality, threat and vulnerability 
 
This cube consists of 125 smaller cubes, each with a value ranging between 1 and 125. The color code has 
been changed to show the new value range. Scales for x-axis, y-axis and z-axis are shown, and the origin for 
the numeration is the left front vertex, whose cube has a value of 1.    
Each color represents a different risk: 
  represents a very high risk (between 100 and 125). Countermeasures to mitigate the risk should be 
adopted immediately. 
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  represents a high risk (between 75 and 99). Countermeasures to mitigate the risk should be adopted 
as soon as possible. 
  and   represent a moderate risk (in yellow for values between 50 and 74, and green for values 
between 25 and 49), the first considerably higher than the latter. Countermeasures to mitigate the risk 
should be planned in the near future.  
  represents a low risk (between 1 and 24). Countermeasures to mitigate the risk would increase 
security, but this risk is not as urgent as others. 
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6 Define attack cases for modelling and the required performance vectors (high 
level) to react against attack situations 
6.1. Define scope of the analysis 
A case study is an exhaustive analysis of an individual example to better understand a complex process, 
system or methodology, or to verify something already known. In a case study, a limited number of 
conditions and their relationships are chosen and studied. In this way, a phenomenon can be examined in its 
context, when the boundaries between phenomena are not clear, and different sources of information are 
studied.  
Even when some people state that case studies are not reliable as they are focused only on a small number of 
cases, and that this method cannot be generalised, in fact researchers use case studies frequently as a research 
method very successfully, in many disciplines.     
In this report, case study method will be applied to help understand attacks to networks. Two cases will be 
chosen: Poland and Italy. The effects of a cyber-attack, a human failure or hardware breakdown on Polish 
and Italian electric networks will be studied.   
6.2. Requirements to estimate cost/consequence estimates  
The most used method to carry out a risk assessment implies determining, for each different failure or attack, 
three variables: criticality, threat and vulnerability. 
Firstly, the electric network and its components must be studied. This involves knowing the systems and 
assets which make up the network, as well as their connections and the way data are transmitted from a part 
to another. The exact location of all parts and interfaces with other components must be discovered.  
Once all assets and their connections are studied, criticality will be examined. Criticality can be defined as 
the importance of each asset, this is, the consequences (in time, money) of the loss or damage to the asset. To 
calculate criticality, the following aspects will be considered:  
 Cost of needed repairs, if possible. If not, cost of replacement of the facility. 
 Loss of time and money derived of the impossibility to use the facilities. These issues can be very 
important, if the attack produces a blackout.  
 Advantages to the attacker: press coverage, political or tactical advantages.  
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The next variable is threat. It is a measure of the danger of a terrorist attack. To determine threat, police 
forces, public and private organizations and agencies, health services and emergency organizations can 
provide important data related to crime in an area. The next subjects must be evaluated: 
 Type of attacker: Hacktivist, terrorist, employee, hacker, etc. 
 Category of attacker: Terrorist or criminal, insider and/ or outsider of the organization, foreign or 
domestic. 
 Objective of the attacker: Sabotage, sociopolitical objectives, theft, etc. 
 Number of adversaries: Individual suicide bomber, individual activist, group of hackers, gangs, “cells” 
of terrorists, etc. 
 Target selected by adversaries: Power stations, nuclear power plants, transformers, distribution lines, 
etc. 
 Type of planning activities needed to attack: Photography, monitoring police and security patrol 
patterns, fishing, social engineering, etc.  
 Most likely or “worst case” time to attack: Rush hour, at night, when more people are using electricity 
(a very cold day in winter, when an important football match is going to be broadcast). 
 Range of attacker tactics: deceit, force, stealth, combination, etc. 
 Capabilities of attacker: Knowledge, skills, motivation, weapons and tools. 
Finally, for each facility, vulnerability must be assessed. It determines the weakness of the asset, the ease to 
be attacked. In this case, the factors to consider are: 
 Location: Geographic location, routes to get to the facility entry (ease to enter the facility is measured 
by “accessibility”). Vulnerability measures difficulty to access the public or private website or computer 
system.    
 Accessibility: Unlike location, it measures the ease to enter, that is, the measures to close the facility 
and avoid access to attackers. Vulnerability measures difficulty to access the software and programs 
which control processes.   
 Adequacy: Protection of facilities, or difficult access to files or programs that can be used to cause 
harm. 
 Availability: Effective protection measures to counteract an attack.    
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6.3. A case study method approach 
As commented next, there is a wide variety of methods to study the impact of a cyber-attack on the electric 
system. Some of them are: table analysis, algorithmic analysis, threat trees, bar charts, Pareto diagrams, etc. 
In other cases, meetings, interviews or presentations can be carried out to gather or transmit information to 
one or more professionals.  
Nevertheless, one of the simpler and at the same time more effective methods is table analysis. This is the 
method will be used to carry out the case studies.  
In table analysis, the next steps shall be followed: 
1) Gather information on the electric system: Components and their connections, transmission of data. 
2) Identify critical assets: Determine which assets are more important, this is, assets which will cause 
the biggest damages to assets (especially if they are symbolic assets) or people, or losses of money 
or time.  
3) Determine criticality: Estimate, for all assets, but especially critical assets, the impact of the loss or 
damage to the asset. This is, carrying out an economic impact analysis to determine cost of repair or 
replacement, cost of the lost time and other losses due to unavailability of the assets, and damage to 
people.   
4) Identify threats: Measure the risk of a terrorist attack. This implies investigate about the existence of 
terrorist, their motivation and intention, capability to attack, type, number and organization of 
terrorists along with targets and ways to attack. 
5) Identify vulnerability: This means determining the protection of the asset, how easy it is for terrorists 
to attack the objective. It is necessary to assess the place where the asset is, the access to the site, the 
protection of the files or documents in this site, and the existence and effectiveness of protection 
measures.  
6) Combining and weighting criticality, threat and vulnerability, the risk can be calculated. In this way, 
assets can be classified according to a combination of the probability to be attacked and the damage 
an attack would produce.  
7) Reviewing standards, it is possible to select some countermeasures to try reducing the risk of assets, 
especially more critical ones, or those which are at high risk.  
8) Cost analysis of the implementation of the countermeasures: It is necessary to compare the known 
cost of the damage or destruction of an asset (not only money, but also lost time) with the estimated 
cost of implementing the solutions needed. If, taking into account all the damages and costs together 
the sum is smaller than the cost of the solution, this will not be implemented.          
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6.4. Attack cases 
Electric systems are becoming more dependent on the Internet and computers. This implies a vast amount of 
advantages, such as real-time information on the system, to detect problems or ensure that it is working 
correctly. Besides, the Internet allows controlling the system and communicating with it from anywhere 
using SCADAs.  
However, this ease of access to systems can pose an important threat: individuals and organisations can 
attack systems from remote locations and in a secure manner as it is difficult to identify and arrest them.  
There is a big variety of ways to attack power systems, as explained before in part 4 of this Document. 
However, from the point of view of the electric network, it is more important to identify the effects of the 
attack on the system than their origin or source. These effects are the following: 
6.4.1. Steal of confidential information  
Some attacks are intended for getting some confidential information, such as passwords or logins. 
Sometimes, passwords are used to enter the system and cause further damages, such as loss or change of 
information or loss of control of the system. In these cases, this attack is only a way to get the real objective 
of the attacker.  
However, stolen information can be used directly to cause damage. Attackers can steal confidential 
information on a company to steal money, to impersonate the company, to commit fraud or forgery, or 
simply blackmailing the company by threating it to make public confidential or sensitive information if the 
company does not pay a ransom or take an action.   
6.4.2 Manipulation and remote control of the system 
When the attacker takes over the system, he can cause big damages. He could control and hinder 
communications with the system, and make it uncontrollable for legitimate users. It is easy to imagine the 
damages an attacker could cause: get information on the system and data on people, hinder maintenance and 
operation activities, disturb power supply, cause blackouts, slow down control in emergency situations and 
even destroy the system (and related assets).  
6.4.3 Change or loss of information: Modify, erase or corrupt files 
Viruses and other types of attacks can change historic or current data, corrupt or erase files, or all the hard 
disk. Maybe change of information can be more dangerous, as it is more difficult to detect, unless somebody 
looked into data and discovered changes. Another option would be controlling communication between 
parties by means of changing messages they receive and send (this attack can be used to steal information 
too).    
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6.4.4 Hindering or slowing down of operations 
Some attacks are intended to disrupt communications and avoid control of the system or exchange of 
information between people. This can be done in order to control or manipulate the system, but sometimes, 
the objective of the attacker is simply avoid communications or make operators lose control of their systems. 
In these cases, the system operation is not controlled, and possible breakdowns, accidents and emergencies 
(not directly caused by the attacker) would not be discovered.  
A typical way to get this is a Denial of Service (DoS). The attacker prevents legitimate users from entering 
the systems using a variety of methods: forcing repeatedly the system to reset or saturating the computer 
with external communication requests in such a way that it cannot respond legitimate requests. Other 
possibility would be using programming flaws which, if activated, consume large amounts of memory.  
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7. OTHER METHODS TO EVALUATE THREATS 
The information to build the following methods has been gathered from MAGERIT (Metodología de 
Análisis y Gestión de Riesgos de los Sistemas Informáticos). This methodology, which has been developed 
by the Spanish Government (Ministry of Finance and Public Administration), is defined as a formal method 
to look into the risk in the I.T. systems, used to recommend suitable measures to control these risks. 
MAGERIT methodology consists of three documents or “books”. In the first book, called “MAGERIT-Libro 
1-Metodología”29, the general risk assessment method is explained, along to some advices to develop a 
security plan for I.T. assets. The second document, “MAGERIT-Libro 2-Catálogo de Elementos”30 describes 
existing I.T. assets, an asset value assessment methodology, a threat classification and finally safeguards. 
Finally, the third document, “MAGERIT-Libro 3-Técnicas”31 is a compilation of threat evaluation methods, 
which will be explained below.  
7.1. Algorithmic analysis 
In general, an analysis is a study carried out to split something into all its parts or elements, to know these 
elemental parts. In a qualitative analysis , only the relative importance of the assets will be known, this is, 
assets will be ordered according to their value, but values will not be known. On the contrary, in a 
quantitative analysis , values will be exactly calculated.   
 
                                                 
29 Gobierno de España, Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas, Secretaría de estado de Administraciones Públicas, Dirección General 
de Modernización Administrativa, Procedimientos e Impulso de la Administración Electrónica. (October 2012). MAGERIT – version 3.0 
Metodología de Análisis y Gestión de Riesgos de los Sistemas de Información. Libro 1-Método. Madrid.  
http://administracionelectronica.gob.es/?_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=PAE_PG_CTT_Area_Descargas&langPae=es&iniciativa=184  
 
30 Gobierno de España, Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas, Secretaría de estado de Administraciones Públicas, Dirección General 
de Modernización Administrativa, Procedimientos e Impulso de la Administración Electrónica. (October, 2012). MAGERIT – version 3.0 
Metodología de Análisis y Gestión de Riesgos de los Sistemas de Información. Libro 2-Catálogo de Elementos. Madrid.  
http://administracionelectronica.gob.es/?_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=PAE_PG_CTT_Area_Descargas&langPae=es&iniciativa=184  
 
31 Gobierno de España, Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas, Secretaría de estado de Administraciones Públicas, Dirección General 
de Modernización Administrativa, Procedimientos e Impulso de la Administración Electrónica. (October, 2012). MAGERIT – version 3.0 
Metodología de Análisis y Gestión de Riesgos de los Sistemas de Información. Libro 3-Guía de Técnicas. Madrid.  
http://administracionelectronica.gob.es/?_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=PAE_PG_CTT_Area_Descargas&langPae=es&iniciativa=184  
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 7.1.1 Qualitative analysis 
In this kind of analysis, the objective is to know the different elements that make up an asset, and their 
relative importance, without knowing their exact value. The next steps shall be followed: 
 Value of assets: It is necessary to assign a relative (not real) value to the assets to assess them. Different 
scales can be used, but all of them will look like this: 
                                         V= (0,.., v0,v1,…, vi,…) 
              
             The value 0 means that the asset has no value, it can be lost without any damage or loss. Value    
should include not only the mere value of the asset (if it has to be replaced) or the reparation (if it 
can be repaired) but also loss of time and money.  
 Dependences between assets: It is important to know if the asset A can affect or depends on an asset B. 
In this way, graphs showing dependences between different assets can be drawn: 
Asset A
Asset B Asset C
Asset D Asset E Asset F
 
Figure 5: example of assets dependency diagram 
 Cumulative value of an asset A: It is the sum of the values of the asset A plus all the other assets 
which depend on asset A, and which would be damaged if A suffered an attack.  
 Loss of value of an asset: If an asset suffers an attack, part of its value is lost. It is represented as “d” , 
whose value can vary between 0 (total loss of value) and 1 (no loss of value). Thus, the new value of the 
asset would be: 
      New value= d.vi  
 Loss of value of an asset related to threats to other assets: If an asset B depends on an asset A, and 
asset A suffers an attack which makes him lose its value to “d.vA”, then asset B would lose value as 
well. The new value of B will be “d.vB”. 
 Probability of the attack: A probability will be assigned to each attack. A scale will be used, like this: 
P= (0, p1, p2,., pi,…) 
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It is possible, but not compulsory, to use a scale between 0 and 1. Probabilities are related to a 
certain period of time: they will be different if probability of an attack is measured for a month or 
for a year.   
 Risk: It depends on impact (loss of value of assets) and probability. Generally, this function is defined 
as follows: 
R = Probability x Loss of value of the asset 
            Minimum risk will be 0.  
 Cumulative risk: It is calculated like risk, but using cumulative loss of value.  
 Safeguard packet: To counteract a threat, some protection measures will be employed. Its efficacy, ”e” 
will vary between 0 and 1. 
 Residual loss of value of an asset: As defined before, loss of value is defined as “d”, and the new value 
is “d.v”. If protection measures are applied, new loss of value will be “dr”, and the new value will be 
“dr.v”. “dr” will vary between 0 and “d”, being 0 if protection measures are totally effective, and “d” if 
there are no protection measures, or they are totally useless. 
Residual loss of value = dr.vi 
  Residual probability of the attack: If countermeasures are employed, the probability of an attack will 
be reduced from “p” to “pr”. “pr” will vary between 0, if the protection is perfect, and “p” if the 
protection in totally useless. 
 Residual risk: It is defined as risk, but using residual probability and residual loss of value. 
     
Residual risk = Residual probability x Residual loss of value of the asset 
 
In this qualitative analysis, asset value “vi”, probability “pi” and risk “Ri” are measured relatively to other 
assets. This is, used values are not real, but they show the importance of an asset compared to the others.  
7.1.2 Quantitative analysis 
This analysis is similar to the qualitative analysis, but the objective is to know the real value and importance 
of the asset, and the exact damages and losses related to an attack to this asset. Thus, this model does not use 
a discrete scale, but real positive numbers.    
 Value of assets: The value of an asset is a real number equal or bigger than 0. “v0” represents the limit 
between relevant and negligible values. 
 Dependences between assets: It is important to know if an asset depends on other or not, and this 
dependence is evaluated by a coefficient that varies between 0 (independent assets) and 1 (total 
dependence).  
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 Cumulative value of asset A: If some assets B, C, D… depends on an asset A with certain coefficients, 
the cumulative value of the asset A is the sum of the value of A plus the values of B, C, D… each one 
multiplied by the respective coefficient. 
    
Cumulative value of asset A = Value (A) + Σ i(value (X) x coefficient (X)) 
 
 Loss of value of an asset: When the asset is attacked, its value is reduced. The loss is represented as 
“d”, similarly to the qualitative case. “d” varies between 0 and 1. Thus, the  value of the asset will be: 
 
New value= d.vi 
 
 Loss of value of an asset related to threats to other assets: If an asset A depends on B, the damage 
suffered by B is transmitted, to some extent, to A. If vA is the value of A, d is the loss of value of B, and 
“cA-B” is a coefficient that represents the relation between the values of A and B, the new value of A will 
be: 
New vA= d x vA x cA-B 
 
      It is important to notice that, in this formula, the value of the asset B is not used. 
 Probability of the attack (p): The probability will be the ARO, or Annual Rate of Occurrence if it is 
referred to 1 year. It will vary between 0 (impossible attack) and 1 (certain attack). Sometimes, if 
probability is smaller than a value p0, it is not considered.   
 Risk: It is calculated in a similar way than in qualitative analysis: 
 
R = Probability x Loss of value of the asset 
 
 Cumulative risk: It is calculated like risk, but using cumulative loss of value.  
 Safeguard packet: Some protection measures are used to fight a threat. Its efficacy, ”e” will vary 
between 0 (the measures do not protect) and 1 (the measures protect totally). It is possible to distinguish 
between an efficacy against frequency, “ef” and efficacy against loss of value, “e i”. Total efficacy can 
be defined using this formula: 
(1-e
i
) x (1-e
f
) = 1-e 
 
 Residual loss of value of an asset: If “d.vi” is the new value of the asset after a totally effective attack, 
“dr” will define the loss of value when protective measures are applied. “dr” will be 0, and there will 
not exist any impact if the effectiveness of measures is total, this is, e
i=1. “dr” will be “d” if the 
measures do not protect and e
i=0. “dr” will take intermediate values for e i ranging 0 and 1. 
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Residual value = dr.vi 
 
 Residual probability of the attack: If the protection is totally effective (ef=1), probability will be 0, 
and if protection are useless (e
f
=0), probability will be “p”, the probability before applying protection. 
For other values of e
f
, pr will take intermediate values.    
 Residual risk: It is defined as risk, but using residual probability and residual loss of value. 
     
Residual risk = Residual probability x Residual loss of value of the asset 
In quantitative analysis, all variables are real numbers, greater than or equal to 0.   
7.2. Threat trees 
Threat trees are used to represent all the possible ways to attack an objective. This objective is the “root” of 
the tree. Iteratively, different “branches” are drawn, representing ways to attack the objective. It is possible 
to draw intermediate nodes representing steps to be reached when following a way to attack (or a “branch”). 
If there is more than one objective or asset, each one will have its tree, so it will be necessary to draw what is 
called a “threat forest”. 
Threat trees allow understanding graphically and quickly different ways to attack an asset, and designing 
protections. Besides, the objectives of an attacker can be analysed, along with the knowledge, abilities, 
information, etc. which he would need. 
Generally, it is possible to follow several alternative ways to reach an objective. Then, the node is called OR 
node. If there are activities that must be carried out simultaneously to success in the attack, the node is an 
AND node.  
Nodes or steps to reach an objective can be completed with information about the attack: knowledge required 
(somebody with no experience, with some experience, a professional hacker, etc.), investment (amount of 
money and time needed to reach the objective) and risk (consequences to the attacker if he is arrested).  
Once this information has been assigned to each node, it is possible to determine the most likely attack, by 
finding the way that requires the less knowledge and investment. If the attacker profile is known, the branch 
chosen will be that which requires the less expenses given the attacker knowledge. 
On the other hand, if protection measures are applied, their effects can be:  
 Increasing the required knowledge and abilities of the attacker to succeed in the attack. Ideally, the 
attack should be impossible no matter the knowledge. 
 Increasing the required money to succeed in the attack. Ideally, the cost of the attack should be bigger 
than the potential gains. 
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Ideally, protection measures should eliminate all the branches, but normally security levels only have to 
reach a certain level.  
To draw the tree, it is necessary to know where the biggest value of the asset is, along with attackers’ 
objectives. Ideally, all possible branches should be drawn, but it depends on the imagination and knowledge 
of the analyst. The more experience is got from successful or detected attacks, the more the system can be 
improved. Some ideas to get this experience are the following: 
 Gather experience from the company, or other companies. 
 Brain storming meetings, where some people suggest, in an informal way, possible ideas of attackers. In 
this way, it is possible to get ideas, which must be ordered and carefully analysed. 
 Tools suggesting attacks based on the nature of the assets. 
The algorithmic analysis, explained formerly, can be used to determine the nature of the assets and relations 
between them. In this way, assets which can be used as a way to more important assets are defined.  
In conclusion, threat trees are very useful to determine threats and prevention. They help to think like the 
attacker, foreseeing their actions. Threat trees are very difficult to build if no or little information can be 
gathered, but when there is some experience available, they can use it effectively.  
On the other hand, they must be carefully protected from attackers, because they can be a very useful tool to 
succeed in the attack. Besides, to analyse all possible threats to a complex system, it is necessary to build a 
great amount of very complex trees.        
7.3. Graphic methods 
Sometimes, representing risks (determined using algorithmic analysis or table analysis) in a graph can help 
to make decissions or understand risks. There are a variety of methods to represent risks: 
7.3.1 Line graph 
It is the most clasical graph. X and Y axes are used, representing in the abcissa axis the threat and in the 
ordinate axis the risk. Ordinate axis can be linear or logarithmic. Linear scale can be used when risks do not 
vary very much, and logarithmic must be used when they are very different.  
On the other hand, linear scale can show absolute difference between two values: 
 
xi-xj 
while logarithmic scale shows relative difference: 
xi-xj 
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xi 
Risks can be drawn as points, or link the points using lines. Sometimes horizontal lines can be used to show 
thresholds (minimum or maximum values to make a decision). The following is an example of these graphs. 
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Figure 6: Example of linear graph 
7.3.2 Bar chart 
In a bar chart, data are ordered in X and Y axes: in the abscissa axis the threat and in the ordinate axis the 
risk. They are similar to line graphs, but they can show less data (as bars take up more space than points and 
lines). Similarly to line graphs, Y axis can be logarithmic (if data vary very much) or linear (if data are 
similar). Horizontal lines can be drawn to show minimum or maximum thresholds.  
  
                                  
 
Figure 7: Example of bar chart representation 
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7.3.3 Radar chart 
These graphs show all the variables in semi-axes or radii which radiate from the centre of the log. Each 
radius represents a variable, and they are graduated to show levels and thresholds in linear or logarithmic 
scale. The value of each variable is marked in its radius (the centre is the value 0 for all variables). All the 
marks are linked by segments, resulting in an irregular star-shape polygon called radar chart.  
This graph helps to study globally the risks, showing their features, trends and relations between risks.  
Once the risks are calculated, to get the chart the first step is drawing the centre and radii. Scales are drawn 
in the radii, drawing a circle (or regular polygon) with all the radii inside it. It is important that the angles 
between consecutive semi-axes are always the same. Sometimes circles or polygons are drawn representing 
minimum or maximum thresholds.  
These diagrams are useful to show graphically balance or unbalance in the axes, to show maximum and 
minimum profiles and to show evolution.  
 
Figure 8: example of radar chart 
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7.3.4Pareto diagram 
Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) was an Italian sociologist who studied the income distribution. He discovered 
that 80% of wealth belongs to 20% of the population, and 80% of the population owns the 20% of the 
wealth, in all societies throughout history. This was called Pareto principle or 80-20 rule. 
This law has also been applied to quality and business management, where it can be summed up as: “if a 
problem has several causes, 20% of them cause the 80% of the problem, while solving the remaining 80% of 
the causes will only solve 20% of the problem”.  
Pareto diagrams are used to graphically separate the few and very important aspects and the many and 
irrelevant aspects. In this way, it is possible to focus on important aspects, solving most of the problem.  
This graph shows in the abscissa axis the problems, and in ordinate axis the cost of the cause. The different 
causes are represented in decreasing order: the few important causes in the left and the many irrelevant in the 
right. It is possible to show, at the same time, the aggregate risk in percentage.      
Using this graph, it is possible to analyse the risk according to the assets, determining the assets that cause 
most problems. Besides, they are useful to detect which threats are more dangerous. The following graph is 
an example of Pareto diagram.  
 
Figure 9: example of pareto diagram 
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7.3.5Pie chart 
These diagrams show data as circle sectors, each sector covering an angle proportional to its value. Together, 
the sectors make up a full circle, this is, 360º. Generally, these graphs use linear scale.  
Commonly, data are ordered decreasingly, as in Pareto diagrams. Pie charts are used to show graphically the 
contribution of all parts to the total, but they are not suitable to represent very much data.  
 
 
Figure 10: example of pie chart 
 
7.4. Working sessions 
Working sessions can be used to gather information, communicate results, save time, ease users and 
managers’ participation or increase quality. According to participants, objective and how they are conducted, 
they are divided into interviews, meetings and presentations.  
7.4.1 Interviews 
Interviews are working sessions aimed at getting information from people individually or in groups. They 
can be structured when there is a set of planned questions without improvising or non-structured when there 
is no rigid questionnaire.  
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In general, these interviews are semi-structured: there is a set of questions, but the interviewee can answer in 
a different order, or expand on some points. It is very important that no useful information is hidden or 
forgotten, and, at the same time, to gather only useful information, without excessive details.   
The following people within an organisation must be interviewed: 
 Managers: They know the consequences of attacks for the organisation. 
 Service team: They know the services provided, and the consequences of no providing them.  
 Data team: They know used data, their value and the consequences of attacks on them. 
 Information Systems and Operation teams: They know the systems, their history, the consequences of 
an incident, protection measures and new activities related to security.   
7.4.2 Meetings 
Meetings are aimed at gathering information from different people, making strategic decisions, 
communicating ideas and results and analysing needs for information.  
To call a meeting, it is necessary to: 
 Prepare the meeting: agenda, attendants, place, objectives, material, available time. 
 Send attendants the call containing the agenda, date, start time, end time, place and attendants.  
 In the beginning of the meeting, it is important to do a summary of the agenda, the objectives, and the 
method. 
 In the end, conclusions should be drawn, agreements made and pending points determined. A date for 
next meeting should be set.   
 The secretary, who takes notes in the meeting, should draft minutes and send them to attendants.  
  
7.4.3 Presentations 
Presentations are used by a working team to communicate advances, conclusions and results to attendants. 
They can be made to inform about the progress of a project, or final results.  
The first step is determining the objective of the presentation, and the information to communicate. Then, it 
is important to decide who the lecturer is, what matter he will explain, what the duration, place and tools will 
be and who the audience will be.  
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Next, the message has to be structured to make it clear and well organised. The approach will be chosen 
according to the audience. Normally, the presentation is divided into introduction, background, core, review 
and final conclusion.     
It is important to carefully select the tools: statistic data, visual tools, etc. There should not be too much, 
because if they are, public will not pay attention to what is said, and technic problems are more likely. 
Before the beginning of the presentation, all tools should be checked.  
The lecturer should speak clearly and correctly, paying attention to formal aspects. Besides, he should be 
open to questions and comments from audience.      
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7.5. Delphi assessment 
 
Delphi assessment was developed by the RAND (Research ANd Development) Corporation and 
used firstly for military purposes. It is a structured communication technique, based on the answers 
of a pannel of experts to some questionnaires, in two or more rounds. After each questionnaire, the 
experts’ opinions and explanations are summarized in a document which is sent to all experts. In 
this way, they can revise their own answers after reading other opinions. The process is stopped 
after a pre-defined number of rounds, when a consensus is reached or when answers do not differ 
substantially. The average scores will be the final conclusions. This method is suitable for this 
analysis for these reasons: 
 It is a good methodology to study, qualitatively, very complex problems. 
 Experts in the subject will give their opinions on it, so the best ideas and opinions will be gathered. 
 It is based on an initial scenario, which help to identify the existing situation and problems. 
 It is a better methodology than simply collect individual opinions, since these opinions are confronted 
and a more better solution can be reached.  
 As expert answers questionnaires, it is not possible that some opinions prevail over other on account of 
simply the expert power of persuasion or reputation.  
A Delphi assessment consists of the following steps: 
a) Prepare a questionnaire. 
b) Deliver the questionnaire to a panel of experts in the studied subject. 
c) When answers are received, a statistic study (e.g. histogram) is carried out to determine how 
many experts choose each option. 
d) If experts choose clearly an option, this will be the solution and the process ends. 
e) If there are clear differences between opinions, the same questionnaire will be sent again, 
along with the histogram. Experts are asked if they want to change answers or not.  
f) If the results of the second round are again unclear, new questionnaires can be sent, or a 
meeting can be called to reach a consensus. A second round is commonly necessary, and 
more rounds can better solutions reached, but experts can get tired of the process. Anyway, 
if answers are very different, it is important to review if the question has been clearly posed, 
or new questions or experts should be included in the study.  
Generally, a panel of experts should consist of among 15 and 35 people. More people will be called 
if the subject is general. The Delphi methodology has the following advantages: 
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 If experts think about the subject alone, it is possible that total number of ideas will be bigger than in a 
meeting. 
 As all experts have to write answers, they think better them than if they simply talk. 
 Experts answer individually, so their opinion is not influenced by other opinions (for example, experts 
who take an excessive leading role).  
 Answers are anonymous, so experts can answer freely and do not tend to adhere to the majority opinion.  
 Experts can be in different places and answer questionnaires from their workplaces. 
 Experts can change or improve their views in a feedback process achieved using questionnaires.  
 Experts give informed opinion, which can be different from common opinion in society.    
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ANEX 1. LIST OF TERRORIST  
Groups  prepared by National Counter - terrorism Center 
http://www.nctc.gov/site/other/fto.html 
1.   Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)  
2.   Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)  
3.   Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMS)  
4.   Al-Shabaab  
5.   Ansar al-Islam (AAI)  
6.   Army of Islam (AOI)  
7.   Asbat al-Ansar  
8.   Aum Shinrikyo (AUM)  
9.   Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)  
10.   Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA)  
11.   Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)  
12.   Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group)  
13.   HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)  
14.   Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI)  
15.   Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B)  
16.   Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)  
17.   Hizballah (Party of God)  
18.   Islamic Jihad Group  
19.   Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)  
20.   Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) (Army of Mohammed)  
21.   Jemaah Islamiya organization (JI)  
22.   Kahane Chai (Kach)  
23.   Kata'ib Hizballah (KH)  
24.   Kongra-Gel (KGK, formerly Kurdistan Workers' Party, PKK, KADEK)  
25.   Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LT) (Army of the Righteous)  
26.   Lashkar-e-Jhangvi  
27.   Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)  
28.   Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)  
29.   Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)  
30.   Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)  
31.   National Liberation Army (ELN)  
32.   Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)  
33.   Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)  
34.   Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)  
35.   PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC)  
36.   Al-Qa’ida (AQ)  
37.   Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)  
38.   Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)  
39.   Real IRA (RIRA)  
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40.   Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)  
41.   Revolutionary Organization 17 November  
42.   Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)  
43.   Revolutionary Struggle (RS)  
44.   Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL)  
45.   Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (QJBR) (al-Qaida in Iraq) (formerly Jama'at al-Tawhid wa'al-
Jihad, JTJ, al-Zarqawi Network)  
46.   Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)  
47.   United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) 
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GROUPS AND ENTITIES from Official Journal of the European Union 16.6.2009 
Source:  COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 501/2009 
1. Abu Nidal Organisation’ – ‘ANO’ (a.k.a. ‘Fatah Revolutionary Council’, a.k.a. ‘Arab Revolutionary Brigades’, a.k.a. 
‘Black September’, a.k.a. ‘Revolutionary Organisation of Socialist Muslims’)  
2. Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade  
3. Al-Aqsa e.V.  
4. Al-Takfir’ and ‘Al-Hijra  
5. Aum Shinrikyo’ (a.k.a. ‘AUM’, a.k.a. ‘Aum Supreme Truth’, a.k.a. ‘Aleph’)  
6. Babbar Khalsa  
7. Communist Party of the Philippines’, including ‘New People's Army’ – ‘NPA’, Philippines, linked to SISON, Jose 
Maria (a.k.a Armando Liwanag, a.k.a Joma, who plays a leading role in the ‘Communist Party of the Philippines’, 
including ‘NPA’)  
8. Gama'a al Islamiyya’ (a.k.a. ‘Al Gama'a al Islamiyya’) (‘Islamic Group’ – ‘IG’)  
9. İslami Büyük Doğu Akıncılar Cephesi’ – ‘IBDA C’ (‘Great Islamic Eastern Warriors Front’)  
10. Hamas’, including ‘Hamas Izz al Din al Qassem  
11. Hizbul Mujahideen’ – HM  
12. Hofstadgroep  
13. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development 
14. International Sikh Youth Federation – ISYF 
15. Kahane Chai’ (a.k.a. ‘Kach’)  
16. Khalistan Zindabad Force’ – ‘KZF’  
17. Kurdistan Workers' Party – PKK, (a.k.a. ‘KADEK’, a.k.a. ‘KONGRA GEL’)  
18. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam – LTTE 
19. Ejército de Liberación Nacional’ (‘National Liberation Army’)  
20. Palestine Liberation Front – PLF 
21. Palestinian Islamic Jihad – PIJ  
22. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – PFLP  
23. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command’ (a.k.a. ‘PFLP – General Command’)  
24. ‘Fuerzas armadas revolucionarias de Colombia’ – ‘FARC’ (‘Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’)  
25. ‘Devrimci Halk Kurtuluș Partisi-Cephesi’ – ‘DHKP/C’ (a.k.a. ‘Devrimci Sol’ (‘Revolutionary Left’), a.k.a. ‘Dev 
Sol’) (‘Revolutionary People's Liberation Army/Front/Party’)  
26. ‘Sendero Luminoso’ – ‘SL’ (‘Shining Path’)  
27. ‘Stichting Al Aqsa’ (a.k.a. ‘Stichting Al Aqsa Nederland’, a.k.a. ‘Al Aqsa Nederland’)  
28 ‘Teyrbazen Azadiya Kurdistan’ – ‘TAK’ (a.k.a. ‘Kurdistan Freedom Falcons’, a.k.a. ‘Kurdistan Freedom Hawks’)  
29. ‘Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia’ – ‘AUC’ (‘United Self Defense Forces/Group of Colombia’) EN L 151/16  
 
 
 
